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Abstract 
Quizzing and Restudy Dynamics in a TST Paradigm: The (Null) Effect of Feedback and the 
(Significant) Effects of Metacognition 
by 
Francis T. Anderson 
Master of Arts in Psychological & Brain Sciences 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2017 
Professor Mark McDaniel, Chair 
In authentic educational settings, using formative quizzes or tests can improve students’ memory 
by direct strengthening of the memory trace. There are other indirect effects of testing, however, 
such as improved understanding of what one does and does not know. That is, quizzes can 
benefit students’ metacognitive awareness, which may in turn affect their restudy behaviors. We 
tested whether different types of feedback (correct/incorrect, correct answer, or minimal) 
differentially affected students’ metacognition, changed their restudy behaviors, and influenced 
final test performance. We found no effect of feedback type, but were able to better understand 
quizzing and restudy dynamics in an authentic educational scenario. For example, we show that 
even with minimal feedback, participants had insight into which concepts they answered 
incorrectly, because they later chose to restudy those concepts. Additionally, they were 
especially likely to restudy high-confidence errors, which were the most discrepant from 
expected performance. Finally, these behaviors appear to be adaptive, in that the items they 
chose to restudy were more likely to be answered correctly on the final test.
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1.1  Introduction 
 
When applying cognitive psychology to education and instruction, no phenomenon has 
received more attention than the testing effect (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a). Put simply, this is 
the finding that taking practice tests or quizzes benefits memory more than spending an 
equivalent amount of time restudying (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b). In most laboratory studies, 
this benefit is assumed to come from direct effects of testing; that is, the act of retrieval itself 
strengthens the memory trace such that people are better able to recall the same information at a 
later time. This is why the testing effect is often referred to as “retrieval practice”: By practicing 
retrieval people eventually become better at doing so.  
1.1.1 The Influence of Feedback 
Although the testing effect is a robust phenomenon, there are many factors that can 
severely impact the size of an effect. One of these critical factors is the presence or absence of 
feedback provided on the test. For example, feedback (which is not always, but typically 
provided in the form of displaying the correct answer) is generally beneficial and maximizes 
testing effects (Rowland, 2014). Initial performance on the test and the type of feedback 
received, however, can dramatically affect this relationship. For example, feedback especially 
helps on items answered incorrectly on the test, and therefore in the presence of ceiling 
performance there may not be an effect of feedback at all (Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, Kulik, & 
Morgan, 1991; Butler & Roediger, 2007; Pashler, Cepeda, Wixted, & Rohrer, 2005).  
Even more influential is the type of feedback received on the first test. Different types of 
feedback have often been categorized by the degree of elaboration, ranging from almost nothing 
at all (e.g., you got 86% correct), to extreme elaboration (e.g., displaying the correct answer, 
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explaining why it is the correct answer, and showing you the passage in the primary text where 
that answer could have been found) (Kulhavy, White, Topp, Chan, & Adams, 1985). The 
previous two feedback types are rarely used, but a common manipulation is the difference 
between providing correct/incorrect (C/I) feedback (also referred to as knowledge-of-results), 
and providing correct answer (CA) feedback (also referred to as knowledge-of-correct-response) 
(Noonan, 1984). Clearly, CA feedback contains more elaboration than C/I feedback, but which 
causes greater learning on a final test? 
Roper (1977) asked just this question, and found that giving participants no feedback at 
all was the worst, C/I feedback performed better, and CA feedback was the best on a subsequent 
final test. Many other studies have found this same pattern, with more elaborative feedback 
leading to higher performance (Bangert- Drowns et al., 1991; Birenbaum & Tatsuoka, 1987; 
Fazio, Huelser, Johnson, & Marsh, 2010; Gilman, 1969; Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Pashler et 
al., 2005; Sassenrath & Garverick, 1965; Travers, Van Wagenen, Haygood, & McCormick, 
1964). There are some notable exceptions, however. Andre and Thieman (1988), for example, 
found that feedback only benefitted factual questions, but not application questions, and that the 
only difference between C/I and CA feedback was that C/I was better for factual questions that 
were directly repeated from the initial quiz. Additionally, Hanna (1976) found that C/I feedback 
benefitted high-ability students, but that CA feedback was better for low-ability students. Lee 
(1985) found no differences between C/I and CA feedback, and Wentling (1973) actually found 
that C/I feedback was superior to CA feedback (though, if students answered an item incorrectly 
they were encouraged to respond again until they got the answer correct; however, see Butler, 
Karpicke, & Roediger, 2007). Similarly, Noonan (1984) found that C/I feedback (with an 
explanation of why you got a question wrong) was just as good as CA feedback if participants 
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were allowed to make a second choice. Finally, McDaniel and Fisher (1991) found no effect of 
further elaboration on CA feedback (generating a reason why the answer is true, rather than just 
reading the correct answer).  
Therefore, although the majority of studies support the idea that more elaborative 
feedback (typically in the form of providing the CA) is better than less elaboration (typically in 
the form of C/I feedback), there appears to be some situations in which this is not the case. 
Furthermore, although C/I feedback is generally beneficial above not providing feedback at all, 
there are some studies that find no benefit whatsoever (Fazio et al., 2010; Pashler et al., 2005). 
This should be qualified, however, by noting that most studies examining the effect of feedback 
type do not allow a period of restudy, and thereby C/I feedback should not be expected to 
perform better than receiving CA feedback. This is because CA feedback provides the exact 
information necessary to answer a similar question at a later time, and a C/I feedback condition 
typically has no opportunity to identify the correct answers on questions they got wrong. Along 
those same lines, most laboratory studies use identical, repeated questions on the final test, 
maximizing the overlap between the CA feedback and the required final test response. In 
authentic domains, this is rarely the case, with only 25% of instructors claiming they use 
identical questions, and 75% claiming they use similar questions instead (Wooldridge, Bugg, 
McDaniel, & Liu, 2014). McDaniel, Thomas, Agarwal, McDermott, and Roediger (2013), for 
example, showed that middle school science students who were quizzed on definitional questions 
did not improve performance for application questions on a later test. Thus, by using repeated 
questions and not allowing participants in a C/I feedback condition to restudy (which would be 
very uncommon in an educational setting), the claimed benefits of CA feedback for authentic 
classroom studies may be somewhat inflated in the literature.  
4 
 
1.1.2 Indirect Benefits of Testing on Students’ Metacognition 
So far, we have described the direct effects of testing, how feedback can moderate this 
effect, and how educational settings may be different from typical laboratory studies. Despite 
some of those differences, there is also a growing literature showing the benefits of testing in 
classroom settings as well (see McDaniel et al., 2013; McDermott, Agarwal, D’Antonio, 
Roediger, & McDaniel, 2014 for reviews). Although much of this improvement is likely due to 
direct effects of testing, many researchers have suggested that there are additional opportunities 
for indirect (or mediated) effects of testing to play a role in students’ learning (Bjork, 1994; 
Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013; Dunlosky & Ariel, 2011; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a; Son 
& Kornell, 2008). Indirect effects come from such factors as realizing what types of questions 
may be asked, which concepts are more or less challenging, and improved understanding of what 
one does and does not know. By taking tests, students are able to gather a host of information 
that does nothing to directly benefit memory, but can indirectly assist them in the future.  
Of the many indirect benefits, one of the most potent appears to be the metacognitive 
feedback loop between monitoring and control processes in students’ learning behaviors (Nelson 
& Narens, 1994). Metacognition refers to the higher order knowledge of one’s own cognitive 
processes; metamemory, for example, is the accuracy with which someone can gauge what they 
are able to remember and forget. Nelson and Narens proposed that our metacognitive system 
operates by monitoring our own behaviors (e.g., “I could have sworn I’ve seen that man on the 
bus before, but I cannot recall where!”) and engaging control processes to achieve desired 
behaviors (e.g., executing a controlled memory search to determine that he is, in fact, your 
butcher). For example, upon learning (via monitoring) that a particular professor cares little 
about conceptual learning, and instead tests largely on one’s ability to memorize or store 
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information, one might engage control processes to focus their study solely on definitional 
content. 
Further, in typical classroom settings, there are a variety of features that increase the 
scope and influence of metacognitive monitoring and control processes (McDaniel, Bugg, Liu, & 
Brick, 2015). In contrast to most laboratory testing effect studies, students typically do not 
engage in a one-off learning session, but instead have many opportunities to study, take tests or 
quizzes, and restudy the material before a final test. Additionally, students often have their 
books, notes, and quizzes available during such a restudy session. The access to all of this 
information gives students a large degree of freedom to engage control processes and adjust 
restudy behaviors to suit their perceived needs.  
Many studies have examined the influence of participants’ metacognitive judgments on 
subsequent restudy behaviors, with special importance placed on whether items were initially 
answered correctly or incorrectly on a quiz. Critically, of course, feedback in some form is often 
provided, which gives participants’ even more information to base their restudy decisions on. For 
example, many studies have shown that participants choose to restudy items they initially 
answered incorrectly on a quiz. This finding was first documented by Zacks (1969), and later by 
Kulhavy and Stock (1989). Since then, it has been termed the discrepancy reduction hypothesis 
(Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998), and states that people seek to reduce the discrepancy between their 
beliefs about what they think they know and what they actually appear to know by focusing their 
efforts on items answered incorrectly. The discrepancy reduction hypothesis gains additional 
nuance when examining participants’ item-level (for each question) confidence ratings: The 
greatest discrepancy should occur for high-confidence items answered incorrectly, and the lowest 
discrepancy should occur for high-confidence items answered correctly (Kulhavy & Stock, 
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1989). Likelihood to restudy (and/or amount of time spent restudying) is positively correlated 
with discrepancy, such that high-discrepancy items are more likely to be restudied than low-
discrepancy items, and this study allocation strategy is beneficial for final test performance. The 
discrepancy reduction hypothesis has been replicated in many studies (Dunlosky & Thiede, 
1998; Kulhavy, Yekovich, & Dyer, 1976; 1979; Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Thiede & Dunlosky, 
1999), and is supported by other tangential findings such as people choosing to drop-out items 
from restudy that they feel are well-learned (Pyc & Rawson, 2011).  
Although the discrepancy reduction hypothesis has garnered much support, there does 
appear to be particular boundary conditions influencing the likelihood of people choosing to 
adopt such a strategy, as well as whether such a strategy is in fact beneficial. Notably, Nelson 
and Leonesio (1988) found that for some particularly difficult items, no matter how long people 
spend restudying they are unable to answer such questions correctly on a final test. Termed the 
labor-in-vain effect, this finding challenges the general assumption that it is beneficial for 
students to continue studying items they initially answered incorrectly. Mazzoni & Cornoldi 
(1993) also found labor-in-vain effects, but note that they disappeared when experimenter-
imposed time limits were enforced.  
Findings such as these, in conjunction with the discrepancy reduction literature, spurred 
Metcalfe (2009) to introduce her region of proximal learning hypothesis, which states that 
students allocate their study time according to a proximal region of items that have steep learning 
curves. According to Metcalfe, this involves quickly eliminating items identified as particularly 
easy (i.e., items that one is sure to answer correctly on the final test), deliberately ignoring items 
judged to be extremely difficult, and focusing the majority of their time restudying items judged 
as being unknown but easily-learnable. The proximal learning hypothesis is supported by studies 
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showing that when time constraints are imposed, and when all items are presented 
simultaneously (as opposed to one at a time), students do tend to follow the general pattern of 
ignoring especially easy or difficult items (Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999). 
Therefore, although restudying based on a discrepancy reduction control process holds true as a 
general rule, there are conditions in which hard items may be ignored (e.g., students may choose 
to cram right before a test, or knowingly aim to achieve a grade of B) in favor of studying items 
they believe are going to be more efficiently learned.  
Of further interest are findings that show an interaction between effects of metacognitive 
control and the presence or type of feedback received on the initial quiz. We have already noted 
that feedback is especially beneficial for items that were initially answered incorrectly (Bangert-
Drowns et al., 1991), but the metacognitive reasons for why this occurs can be determined by 
additionally looking at item-level confidence. For example, when CA feedback is provided, 
items which are answered incorrectly with high confidence (e.g., high discrepancy) are 
especially likely to be answered correctly on the final test (regardless of an opportunity to 
restudy). This effect is referred to as hypercorrection, and has been shown in a number of 
experiments (Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001; Kulhavy et al., 1976; 1979). Along a related vein, 
Butler, Karpicke, and Roediger (2008) showed that when CA feedback is provided, low-
confidence correct answers were also more likely to persevere as correct answers on a final test 
than when no feedback was provided (see also, Fazio et al., 2010; cf. Kulhavy et al., 1976). 
Additionally, Kulhavy and Stock (1989) proposed that more elaborative feedback should benefit 
high-discrepancy items the most, given that it provides the learner with more information with 
which to correct their initially wrong responses. Finally, Kulhavy et al. (1985) found that 
increasing elaboration above and beyond simply providing CA feedback had little effect on final 
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test performance, but increased study time nonetheless. That is, they found that CA feedback was 
the most efficient in terms of time spent studying and the subsequent benefits on final test 
performance.  
A final note regarding the potential influences of metacognitive monitoring on control 
processes during restudy concerns making a particular kind of metacognitive judgment, called a 
judgment of learning (JOL). JOLs typically take the form of asking participants to look at an 
item they have previously answered (or studied) and to determine how well they think they will 
do on a final test for a similar question. JOLs are similar but distinct from confidence judgments, 
in that both provide a measure of how well one believes they know the information, but JOLs 
additionally ask participants to project that meta-knowledge into beliefs about later performance. 
For example, Mazzoni, Cornoldi, and Marchitelli (1990) found that participants were more likely 
to restudy items they gave low JOLs for (see also Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005). Additionally, when 
Nelson, Dunlosky, Grag, and Narens (1994) asked participants to make item-level JOLs, and 
later gave them the items to restudy they rated as having a low JOL, this boosted final test 
performance (see also Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006 and Thiede, 1999). These findings support a 
discrepancy reduction view, but Kornell and Metcalfe (2006) additionally showed that when 
participants were only allowed to restudy items they answered incorrectly on the quiz, 
participants chose to study items they gave the highest JOLs for. They interpret this as support 
for the proximal learning hypothesis, because participants appeared to selectively restudy items 
they believed they could learn well. 
Though most of the studies reviewed here do not convey perfect metacognitive 
monitoring, the observed effects do lend credence to the idea that students have some 
understanding of what they do and do not know, and that they are able to engage beneficial 
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control processes (cf. labor-in-vain effects). This is not always the case, however, as there is also 
evidence that students are quite over-confident in their monitoring behavior. Rawson and 
Dunlosky (2007), for example, asked participants to recall key definitions from previously 
studied passages; critically, they were also asked to self-score their responses either with or 
without CA feedback provided to help them (see also, Dunlosky, Rawson, & Middleton, 2005). 
The degree to which their self-scored responses matched an objective scoring scheme served as 
the measure of monitoring ability. They proposed two hypotheses: 1- the absence of standard 
hypothesis, which predicts that students’ monitoring ability should be impaired when no 
feedback is provided, and 2- the limited competence hypothesis, which predicts that students 
simply have impaired monitoring ability, regardless of whether or not the correct answers are 
provided. They found support for both hypotheses, with participants displaying better 
metacognitive accuracy in the feedback condition relative to no feedback, but they were still 
remarkably over-confident even when they had the correct answers at their disposal. Therefore, it 
should be noted that monitoring ability is by no means perfect even with CA feedback, and 
students’ ability to grade their own responses is especially poor without feedback.  
1.1.3 The Present Study 
In sum, it appears as though both feedback and metacognitive awareness can have far-
reaching effects on both participants’ restudy behaviors and final test performance. In addition to 
the direct effects of testing, there are many indirect effects that can influence the dynamic 
interplay between taking a quiz, receiving feedback, making restudy decisions based on quiz 
performance, and eventual performance on a final test. A study by McDaniel et al. (2015) sought 
to better understand this interplay in an authentic laboratory setting (i.e., using realistic study and 
test materials, having multiple learning opportunities, and changing the testing/quizzing format) 
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by splitting participants into a repeated study condition (SSS), a test-restudy-test condition 
(TST), and a repeated testing condition (TTT). Five days after this, they received a final, short-
answer test. In their second experiment, when C/I feedback was provided and participants had 
access to their quiz (and feedback) during restudy (for the SSS and TST conditions), the TST 
condition outperformed the TTT condition. They further showed that the number of tested items 
that were highlighted during restudy was significantly greater for the TST condition than for the 
SSS condition. These results suggest that the TST condition was more focused in their restudy 
than the SSS condition, and that these indirect effects of testing on restudy boosted performance 
above the condition in which the direct effects of testing were greatest (TTT). 
In the present experiment, we seek to adapt the McDaniel et al. (2015) methodology to 
more directly examine the potential indirect effects of taking a test on restudy behaviors, and to 
determine what impact, if any, feedback has on these effects. Specifically, using the same 
materials (excerpts from a psychology research methods textbook), all participants took a 
multiple-choice quiz on this information, and we manipulated the degree of elaboration in 
feedback they received.  One condition received minimal feedback in the form of proportion 
correct on the quiz, the other condition received C/I feedback, and the final condition received 
CA feedback. Participants were then allowed to restudy, and we tracked which concepts from the 
quiz were highlighted to determine whether quiz performance and restudy behavior affected 
accuracy on the final test. In addition, we obtained metacognitive ratings of confidence for each 
quiz response, and more broad (not item-level) post-restudy JOLs to determine whether 
participants had accurate knowledge of their own learning.  
One might predict that providing CA feedback will lead to the best retention because it 
contains the exact information necessary to answer a similar question. However, one could also 
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predict that C/I feedback will produce superior retention because it could positively influence 
restudying behavior. Specifically, C/I feedback might help guide restudy by facilitating the 
correction of wrong answers. Because students are not given the correct answer, they must return 
to the text, determine the source of their earlier misconception, and generate a new possible 
correct answer. In doing so, they might develop a more complete understanding of the 
underlying concepts that future test questions are based on. Along these lines, one could also 
predict that the minimal feedback condition will obtain the greatest performance, in that they 
must additionally determine which items they answered incorrectly, and then return to the text to 
generate a new possible answer. The large degree of generative processing could benefit their 
underlying conceptual knowledge and translate into high performance on the final test. 
Alternatively, the minimal feedback condition may not have enough environmental support, 
causing them to restudy ineffectively, and hurt final test performance. Certainly, the majority of 
the literature predicts that receiving minimal feedback should lead to the worst performance. 
Further, by associating highlighted concepts in the text to both quiz and final test 
questions, we can directly observe whether people are selectively restudying poorly learned 
information, and whether this restudying affects final test performance. Finally, confidence 
ratings and JOLs will allow us to test a variety of metacognitive effects in an authentic laboratory 
setting. Specifically, we can determine whether participants seem to favor a discrepancy 
reduction or proximal learning approach, whether students hypercorrect their answers, if 
feedback positively impacts low-confidence correct answers, and if students make accurate 
JOLs. Most of the reviewed literature suggests that participants should be able to effectively 
monitor and engage control processes, but it is unclear whether these effects will be present 
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using authentic educational materials, or when no feedback is provided (Rawson & Dunlosky, 
2007).  
1.2  Method 
 
1.2.1 Participants and Design 
 119 students at Washington University participated in the study for either course credit or 
monetary compensation ($25). Six participants failed to show up to take the final test 2 days 
later, leaving our total sample at 113 participants. Our design was a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed factorial 
containing the within-subjects variables question type (definition, application) and question stem 
(same, different), as well as the between-subjects variable feedback condition (C/I, CA, 
minimal). Participants were randomly assigned to each feedback condition, resulting in 35 
participants in the C/I condition, 40 participants in the CA condition, and 38 participants in the 
minimal feedback condition. 
1.2.2 Materials 
 Our materials were borrowed and adapted from McDaniel et al. (2015), and used the 
same 20 concepts found in a 38 page packet excerpted from Research Methods in Psychology, 
3rd edition (Heiman, 2002). The packet was presented as a PDF using Adobe Reader. Two 
versions of the quiz (A, B) were created containing 40 multiple-choice questions, with both a 
definition and application question for each of the 20 concepts. As an example, a definition 
question for the concept reliability was:  
What is reliability?  
(a) The extent to which a procedure measures what it is intended to measure.  
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(b) The extent to which our results generalize to other participants and other situations.  
(c) The extent to which a measurement reflects the hypothetical construct of interest.  
(d) The extent to which a measurement is consistent, can be reproduced, and avoids error.  
By contrast, the application question for reliability was:  
A student complains to her professor that her essay makes the same points as her friend’s 
but she got a lower grade than her friend. She is complaining that the grading lacks 
_____________.  
(a) Internal validity  
(b) External validity  
(c) Reliability  
(d) Concurrent validity  
Both versions of the quiz tested identical concepts in the same order of presentation. However, 
quiz versions differed by changing the question stem. For example, the first question in quiz 
version A asked:  
__________ is the extent to which a procedure measures what it is intended to measure.  
 (a) Validity 
(b) Reliability 
(c) External Validity 
(d) Subject Attrition 
14 
 
The first question in quiz version B, by contrast, asked: 
What is validity?  
(a) The extent to which a procedure measures what it is intended to measure. 
(b) The extent to which our results generalize to other participants and other situations. 
(c) The extent to which a measurement reflects the hypothetical construct of interest.  
(d) The extent to which a measurement is consistent, can be reproduced, and avoids error. 
For application questions, changing the question stem meant that the two quiz versions received 
different problems or scenarios that targeted the same concept.  
The first half of the quiz contained one question per concept (half definition and half 
application), and the second half of the quiz tested the same concepts but changed whether they 
were definition or application questions (i.e., those that were definition questions in the first half 
were application questions in the second half). The presentation order of the questions was 
initially randomized within each half to create the two quiz versions, but all participants received 
questions in the same order. That is, the presentation order of quiz questions was not randomized 
on a case-by-case basis (e.g., the first question for all participants was a definition question about 
validity; only the question stem changed). However, response options for each question were 
randomized on a case-by-case basis. 
Following submission of the quiz (via Blackboard educational system software), 
participants received feedback in accordance with their condition. Participants in the minimal 
feedback condition were shown the quiz questions, the answers they selected, and an overall 
score on the quiz (e.g., 34 out of 40). Participants in the C/I condition were shown the overall 
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score, the quiz questions, the answers they selected, and whether each question was correct or 
incorrect. Participants in the CA condition were shown all of this information, but a green 
checkmark was located next to correct answer (and red X’s next to each incorrect answer). 
The final test contained 40 short-answer questions, with a definition and an application 
question for each of the 20 concepts. One question (the application question on confounding 
variables) was eliminated because it did not accurately assess knowledge of the intended 
concept, leaving 39 final test questions. As in McDaniel et al. (2015), eight definition questions 
and eight application questions used the same question stems as in the quizzes. Twelve definition 
questions and 12 application questions used different question stems from those in the quizzes. 
McDaniel et al. (2015) randomly determined a priori whether each question on the final test used 
the same-stem or a different-stem from the initial quiz. Therefore, 16 items from the quiz (eight 
definition and eight application) were always presented as same-stem questions and the 
remaining 24 items (12 definition and 12 application) were always presented as different stem 
questions (see above for examples of changing the question stem), though which of these items 
were same-stem or different-stem changed depending on which version of the quiz the 
participant received. In an effort to change the order in which each concept was presented 
between quiz and final test, we randomly determined a priori the position of each question in the 
final test (not on a case-by-case basis). That is, every participant received the final test questions 
in the same order, but this order was randomly determined and different from the order of the 
quiz questions. 
1.2.3 Procedure 
 Participants came to the lab and were initially asked whether or not they had taken a class 
on research methods (notable examples in the psychology department were provided). They were 
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not allowed to participate if they answered yes to this question. Next, they were informed that 
they would be studying a packet on research methods in psychology, would take a quiz on this 
information, have access to their quiz while they restudied the packet, and come back 2 days 
later for a final test.  
Participants were given 1 hour to read a PDF of the textbook excerpts presented on the 
computer and were encouraged to simply read through, rather than study as they went, as the 
packet was fairly long (38 pages). If participants finished early, they were told they could go 
back and reread sections if they wanted, and if they did not quite finish reading the entire packet, 
they were told not to worry.  
Following the initial study session, participants played Tetris for 5 min before proceeding 
to take the quiz. The quiz was administered using Blackboard educational system software, with 
a scrollable window. Therefore, they were allowed to go back and change their answers, as 
would be the case in most educational settings. The quiz was untimed, but took most participants 
approximately 15-20 min. Following each quiz response, participants rated their confidence on a 
1-10 scale, and were encouraged to use the full range of the scale, rather than simply respond 
using 1s and 10s only.  
After they submitted the quiz, feedback was provided by Blackboard according to their 
condition (see Materials). We had participants sitting at a computer with dual-monitors (one with 
the textbook excerpts and one with the quiz), so the experimenter turned on the other monitor 
with the textbook excerpts, and informed participants that they could look at their quiz if they 
chose while they restudied. Fifteen minutes were provided to restudy, and participants were 
asked to highlight the paragraphs they restudied using the Adobe Reader highlight tool. Passages 
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within the text were coded according to what concept was being targeted, as well as whether the 
concept was being defined or explained using applied examples. In this way, we were able to 
code highlighting behavior as targeting the definition or application level of each concept. 
Following restudy, participants were asked to make category-level JOLs regarding the 
information they had studied, been quizzed on, and restudied. Specifically, on a scale of 1-10 
they were asked to rate how well they thought they would perform on the final test for questions 
concerning: Reliability and Validity (e.g., external vs. internal), Research Designs (e.g., between 
vs. within), Potential Confounds (e.g., variables that vary systematically with the independent 
variable), Research Variables (e.g., independent vs. dependent), and Conditions (e.g., control 
condition). After 2 days they returned to take the final short-answer test, which was untimed, but 
took most participants approximately 30-40 min. Total time for both sessions took approximately 
2.5 hours (see Appendix 1.6.1 for a complete list of instructions).  
1.3  Results 
 
1.3.1 Analysis Methods 
 For all analyses, the alpha level was set to .05. In order to examine mean differences in 
final test performance among our between-subjects feedback conditions (C/I, CA, minimal) by 
the within-subjects variables question type (definition, application) and question stem (same, 
different), we employed a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA). In order to look at the 
item level influence of quiz performance (incorrect, 0; correct, 1) on restudy behavior (no 
restudy, 0; restudy, 1), as well as the influence of quiz performance and restudy behavior on final 
test performance (incorrect, 0; correct, 1), we used multilevel logistic regression with participant 
intercepts as a random factor. We used logistic regression because our dependent outcomes were 
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all binary, and we allowed intercepts to vary between participants because responses were nested 
within each subject. Because of the nesting within the data, the assumption of independence 
would be violated using a standard logistic model (i.e., individual cases should be correlated 
within participants). Additionally, the coding scheme for the variable question type was 
definition (0) and application (1), and the scheme for question stem was same-stem (0) and 
different-stem (1). Multilevel modeling was performed using the R package lme4 (Bates, 
Maechler, Bolker, &Walker, 2015) and regression figures were generated using the package 
sjPlot (Lüdecke, 2017).  
Quiz performance, restudy behavior, and final test performance were all matched by 
concept and question type. In this way, for example, we were able to see if a participant 
answered a definition question on validity correctly, whether they studied the section of the text 
providing the definition, and whether they answered a same or similar final test question on the 
definition of validity correctly. Final short-answer test coding was done by the principal 
investigator, whereas quiz and restudy behavior were coded from a rubric by two different 
research assistants. Partial credit was available on the final test, and scores generated by this 
method were used for the ANOVA analyses. For our logistic regression analyses, however, we 
decided to use a strict coding scheme because of the generally high performance on the final test 
(M = .75, SE = .01), and to maintain a binary format. We decided to use a strict rather than 
lenient coding scheme based on overall final test performance, but before running our logistic 
models. Strict coding meant that answers which received partial credit (.5) were coded as 
incorrect (0).  
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1.3.2 ANOVA Analyses on Final Test Accuracy 
 To determine what effect our three feedback conditions had on final test performance, as 
well as whether our feedback conditions differentially impacted our within subjects variables 
question type and stem, we ran a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA. There was a main effect of question 
type, F(1, 103) = 6.21, p < .05, η2 = .06, indicating that application questions were more often 
answered correctly (M = .76, SE = .01) than definition questions (M = .74, SE = .02). There was 
also a main effect of question stem, F(1, 103) = 4.28, p < .05, η2 = .04, indicating that same-stem 
questions were more often answered correctly (M = .77, SE = .02) than different-stem questions 
(M = .74, SE = .02). There was no effect of condition, nor was there any interaction between 
condition and question type or question stem, all F’s < 1. Therefore, it appears as though our 
feedback manipulation had no effect on final test performance (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Final test performance by feedback condition [correct/incorrect (C/I), correct answer 
(CA), minimal], question type (definition, application), and question stem (same, different). 
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There was no effect of feedback condition, nor any interactions with condition. There was a 
significant advantage for application over definition questions, and a significant advantage for 
same-stem over different-stem questions. 
1.3.3 Multilevel Logistic Regression Analyses on Final Test Accuracy 
 Model 1. We ran a logistic mixed effects regression analysis to determine whether initial 
quiz performance influenced restudy behavior, and whether this in turn influenced final test 
performance (see Analysis Methods section for coding details). That is, we allowed quiz 
accuracy and highlighting behavior to interact when predicting final test accuracy. Further, we 
included both question type and question stem in our model as factors to determine whether 
definition or application questions were more likely to be answered correctly, as well as whether 
the use of same or different stems from the quizzes affected performance. Finally, we tested 
whether our 3 feedback conditions obtained different patterns in our model. Condition did not 
interact with quiz accuracy or highlighting, so we included it only as an individual factor. 
Therefore, all results are collapsed across feedback conditions.  
 The results of model 1 can be seen in Table 1. Significant results are best interpreted in 
terms of the odds ratio (OR), which are the odds that an outcome will occur (in this case, 
answering an item correctly or restudying an item), compared to the odds of the outcome not 
occurring (in this case, answering an item incorrectly, or not restudying an item). In instances of 
a negative association (i.e., an OR < 1), we reversed the directionality to maintain a consistent 
format (e.g., we changed more likely to less likely). We found no significant effect of 
highlighting on final test accuracy (OR = 1.04, p > .05), suggesting that participants were just as 
likely to answer a final test question correctly regardless of whether or not they had highlighted 
the concept. Quiz accuracy was a significant predictor (OR = 2.69, p < .001), showing that 
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participants were 2.67 times more likely to answer a final test question correctly if they also 
answered it correctly on the quiz. As can be seen in Figure 2, there was also a significant 
interaction between quiz accuracy and highlighting behavior, which indicates that if participants 
answered a quiz question correctly, they were far more likely to also answer it correctly on the 
final test if they did not restudy it. There was a significant effect of question stem (OR = 1.19, p 
< .05) indicating that participants were 1.19 times more likely to answer same-stem questions 
correctly than different-stem questions. Finally, neither question type (OR = .94, p > .05) nor 
condition (OR = 1.02, p > .05) appeared to significantly impact final test performance.  
Table 1. 
Results from Model 1, showing the interaction between quiz accuracy and highlighting behavior 
on final test accuracy. 
    Final Test Accuracy 
    Odds Ratio CI p 
Fixed Parts 
(Intercept)   1.52 0.94 – 2.45 .089 
Highlight (no restudy, restudy)   1.04 0.74 – 1.45 .831 
QuizAccuracy (incorrect, correct)   2.69 2.14 – 3.37 <.001 
QuestionStem (same, different)   0.84 0.73 – 0.97 .016 
QuestionType (definition, application)   0.95 0.82 – 1.10 .516 
Condition   1.02 0.86 – 1.21 .815 
Highlight:QuizAccuracy   0.46 0.32 – 0.67 <.001 
Random Parts 
τ00, Subject   0.371 
NSubject   106 
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ICCSubject   0.101 
AIC  4704.9 
Observations   4129 
Deviance   4476.607 
Note. ICC = Intraclass correlation coefficient; a measure of the within-subjects correlation in 
responses. τ00 = the variance between subjects. AIC = Akaike information criterion; a measure of 
model fit (when comparing related models, lower values indicate better fit). Odds Ratio = the 
odds that an outcome will occur (in this case, answering an item correctly or restudying an item), 
compared to the odds of the outcome not occurring (in this case, answering an item incorrectly, 
or not restudying an item). See Analysis Methods section for coding details. Significant effects 
are noted in bold. 
 
Figure 2. The interaction between quiz accuracy (0, 1) and highlighting behavior (0, 1) on final 
test performance (0, 1). The interaction shows that participants were more likely to answer final 
test questions correctly for items that were initially right on the quiz but were not restudied. 
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 Model 2. At first glance, the highlighting results from model 1 appear to contradict what 
one might intuitively expect. That is, it looks as though restudying items (that were initially 
answered correctly on the quiz) actually hurt performance on the final test. Based on this 
observation, we theorized that there could be a bias in the data, such that participants selectively 
chose to restudy more difficult items, regardless of whether or not they answered that item 
correctly on the initial quiz. To test this, we averaged across participants the final test 
performance for each individual item, and tested whether item average score predicted the 
likelihood to restudy. There was indeed a bias, with participants being 11.39 times more likely to 
highlight difficult concepts than easier ones.  
 Therefore, we decided to incorporate item average score as a factor in model 2 so that all 
other effects could be interpreted at average levels of item difficulty. All other factors were 
identical to model 1. The results of model 2 are presented in Table 2, and initial inspection of the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC; lower values indicate better model fit) indicated that model 2 
fit the data dramatically better. Further, the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC; the within-
person correlation) increased from .10 to .21, suggesting that our model better accounted for 
within-person variance.  
Table 2. 
Results from Model 2, showing the interaction between quiz accuracy and highlighting behavior 
on final test accuracy, at average levels of item difficulty. 
    Final Test Accuracy 
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    Odds Ratio CI p 
Fixed Parts 
(Intercept)   0.03 0.01 – 0.06 <.001 
Highlight (no restudy, restudy)   1.57 1.05 – 2.34 .027 
QuizAccuracy (incorrect, correct)   2.24 1.73 – 2.91 <.001 
QuestionStem (same, different)   0.81 0.69 – 0.96 .017 
QuestionType (definition, application)   1.03 0.87 – 1.23 .703 
Condition   1.00 0.79 – 1.28 .981 
ItemAvgScore   374.64 244.44 – 574.20 <.001 
Highlight:QuizAccuracy   0.62 0.40 – 0.98 .039 
Random Parts 
τ00, Subject   0.858 
NSubject   106 
ICCSubject   0.207 
AIC  3662.8 
Observations   4129 
Deviance   3382.303 
Note. ICC = Intraclass correlation coefficient; a measure of the within-subjects correlation in 
responses. τ00 = the variance between subjects. AIC = Akaike information criterion; a measure of 
model fit (when comparing related models, lower values indicate better fit). Odds Ratio = the 
odds that an outcome will occur (in this case, answering an item correctly or restudying an item), 
compared to the odds of the outcome not occurring (in this case, answering an item incorrectly, 
or not restudying an item). See Analysis Methods section for coding details. Significant effects 
are noted in bold. 
Unlike in model 1, we now found a significant effect of highlighting (OR = 1.57, p < 
.05), indicating that participants were 1.57 times more likely to answer a final test question 
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correctly if they had highlighted that concept. We again found a significant effect of quiz 
accuracy (OR = 2.23, p < .001), meaning that participants were 2.23 times more likely to answer 
a final test question correctly if they answered the quiz item correctly. As seen in Figure 3, quiz 
accuracy and highlighting behavior significantly interacted, which displays that participants were 
more likely to answer a final test question correctly if they highlighted a concept after getting it 
wrong on the quiz (at average levels of item difficulty). Again, participants were more likely to 
answer same-stem questions correctly than different-stem questions (OR = 1.23, p < .05). As in 
model 1, neither question type (OR = 1.02, p > .05) nor condition (OR = 1.00, p > .05) appeared 
to significantly impact final test performance. 
 
Figure 3. The interaction between quiz accuracy (0, 1) and highlighting behavior (0, 1) on final 
test performance (0, 1) at average levels of item difficulty. The interaction shows that 
participants were more likely to answer final test questions correctly for items that were initially 
wrong on the quiz if they were restudied. 
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1.3.4 Multilevel Logistic Regression Analyses on Metacognitive Influences 
 Discrepancy Reduction. In order to test the discrepancy reduction hypothesis of restudy 
behavior, we sought to determine whether participants selectively restudied items they answered 
incorrectly on the quiz (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998). A one-factor model predicting highlighting 
behavior by quiz accuracy confirmed this hypothesis, indicating that participants were 2.06 times 
more likely to restudy items they answered incorrectly on the quiz (OR = 2.06, p < .001). 
Additionally, the discrepancy reduction hypothesis states that the highest discrepancy should be 
for high-confidence items answered incorrectly, and the lowest discrepancy should be for high-
confidence items answered correctly (Kulhavy & Stock, 1989). Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 
4, there was a significant interaction between confidence and quiz accuracy on highlighting 
behavior (p < .001). The interaction shows that participants were more likely to restudy high-
confidence errors on the quiz than high-confidence successes, supporting discrepancy reduction. 
Interestingly, the interaction also reveals that low-confidence successes were more likely to be 
restudied than low-confidence errors. There was no interaction with feedback condition, p > .05. 
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Figure 4. The interaction between quiz accuracy (0, 1) and confidence (1-10) on highlighting 
behavior (0, 1). The interaction shows that participants were more likely to restudy concepts they 
answered incorrectly with high confidence, relative to high-confidence correct answers. 
Additionally, participants were more likely to restudy low-confidence correct answers relative to 
low-confidence incorrect answers. 
 Region of Proximal Learning. To test the region of proximal learning hypothesis, we 
wanted to see if restudy behavior was impacted by item difficulty. Specifically, the proximal 
learning hypothesis (Metcalfe, 2009) states that participants should selectively restudy items that 
are neither too difficult nor too easy. Therefore, we set quiz accuracy to interact with item 
average score in predicting highlighting behavior. The interaction was significant (p < .01), and 
as seen in Figure 5, participants were more likely to study easy items when they answered them 
incorrectly on the quiz than when they answered them correctly. On one hand, participants do 
seem to quickly eliminate the particularly easy items (i.e., choosing not to study easy items 
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answered correctly). As we described in the Model 2 section, however, there also appears to be a 
general bias towards restudying more difficult items. This finding is in contrast to the proximal 
learning hypothesis and more in line with a discrepancy reduction view. There was no interaction 
with feedback condition, p > .05. 
 
Figure 5. The interaction between quiz accuracy (0, 1) and item average score on highlighting 
behavior (0, 1). The interaction shows that participants were more likely to restudy easier 
concepts that they answered incorrectly, relative to easier concepts answered correctly. 
 Hypercorrection and Perseverance of Low-Confidence Successes. Butterfield and 
Metcalfe (2001) note that high-confidence failures are more likely to be corrected on the final 
test, a finding referred to as hypercorrection. Additionally, Butler et al. (2008) found that CA 
feedback enabled low-confidence successes to perseverate into success on a final test. To test 
whether our results replicated these findings, we looked at the interaction between quiz accuracy 
and confidence on final test performance (p < .01). As seen in Figure 6, participants were more 
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likely to answer a question correctly on the final test if they got it wrong on the quiz with high 
confidence than if they got it wrong with low confidence (e.g., participants hypercorrected their 
responses). Butler and colleagues found perseveration of low-confidence successes when 
comparing responses that received CA feedback to responses that received no feedback. 
Therefore, we let confidence, quiz accuracy, and feedback condition interact. We failed to 
replicate the Butler et al. (2008) findings, in that low-confidence successes were no more likely 
to be answered correctly than low-confidence errors. Further, as can be seen in Figure 7, there 
were no differences in this pattern between the CA and minimal feedback conditions (p > .05). 
 
Figure 6. The interaction between quiz accuracy (0, 1) and confidence (1-10) on final test 
accuracy (0, 1). The interaction shows that participants were more likely to answer final test 
questions correctly for high-confidence successes on the quiz, relative to high-confidence errors 
on the quiz. 
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Figure 7. The interaction between quiz accuracy (0, 1) and confidence (1-10) on final test 
accuracy (0, 1). Panel 1 = C/I feedback, Panel 2 = CA feedback, Panel 3 = minimal feedback. 
This figure displays that there were no differences among conditions for the interaction effect in 
Figure 6. 
 Judgments of Learning. To determine whether or not participants’ JOLs were accurate 
predictors of their final test performance, we coded each item on the final test as to whether or 
not it matched our five broad JOL categories (reliability and validity, research designs, potential 
confounds, variables, and conditions). Not all questions were included, such as questions 
concerning simple random sampling or the use of confederates. Because JOLs were given after 
restudy (on a scale of 1-10), we were only interested in whether participants’ JOLs were 
correlated with final test accuracy by concept category. First, we found using a one-way 
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ANOVA that there were no differences in average JOL ratings among conditions, F(2, 112) = 
.07, p > .05 (C/I: M = 7.85, SE = .17; CA: = 7.80, SE = .20; minimal = 7.89, SE = .17). Next, we 
sought to determine whether participants JOLs were well-calibrated with actual performance on 
the final test. Briefly, calibration is the correlation between predicted performance and actual 
performance across participants (e.g., for JOL ratings of 5, perfect calibration would predict 
average performance of 50%).  
For all categories there was a significant positive correlation between JOLs (divided by 
10) and performance on questions targeting that concept (all p’s < .05). However, there was also 
a positive correlation with nearly all other concept categories (e.g., JOLs for Reliability and 
Validity were highly correlated with questions concerning Experimental Designs), and all JOLs 
were intercorrelated. Therefore, we collapsed across concept category, and found that average 
JOLs were substantially correlated with final test accuracy, r(113) = .57, p < .001. This finding 
did not differ by feedback condition, p > .05. When we plot these results as a calibration graph 
(see Figure 8), the diagonal line represents perfect calibration, with points above the diagonal 
representing under-confidence, and those underneath the diagonal representing over-confidence. 
Based on the graph, participants seemed to make fairly accurate predictions of final test 
performance based on their average JOL, though they were somewhat under-confident. 
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Figure 8. Calibration between participants expected performance (as measured by JOLs) and 
actual final test performance. JOLs were divided by 10 to maintain the same scale (e.g., a JOL of 
5 became .50). The diagonal represents perfect calibration; therefore, data points above the 
diagonal represent under-confidence, and data points below the diagonal represent over-
confidence. Therefore, participants appear to be somewhat under-confident. 
1.4  Discussion 
 
1.4.1 The (Null) Effects of Feedback on Final Test Performance 
 In the present study, we were interested in the interplay between quizzing, restudy 
behavior, and final test performance, as well as whether this differed depending on the type of 
feedback one received on the initial quiz (C/I, CA, minimal). Perhaps surprisingly, we found no 
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effect of feedback type on final test performance, though most of the testing literature 
manipulating feedback suggests that more elaborative feedback (in this case, CA feedback) leads 
to better long-term retention. Most of this literature, however, uses highly controlled laboratory 
research that departs dramatically from testing scenarios in authentic settings. Our study placed 
high priority on mimicking a realistic scenario, and contained several features that could explain 
the lack of an effect of feedback.  
Unlike most laboratory studies, we not only allowed participants a restudy opportunity, 
but they were additionally allowed to look at their quiz during this period. Rather than using 
word-lists or foreign language vocabulary (as is typical in most testing studies), we used excerpts 
from a published textbook on research methods in psychology. Whereas application questions 
are frequently neglected (e.g., in the Rowland, 2014 meta-analysis 81% of studies were limited 
to either word list recall or paired associates—situations in which application questions are 
impossible), we tested participants on both definition and application questions; further, our final 
test contained both repeated and non-repeated questions. Finally, we varied the quiz and testing 
format, such that participants were quizzed on multiple-choice questions, but were tested with 
short-answer questions (in the Rowland, 2014 meta-analysis 65% used identical test formats). 
Some combination of these factors could have reduced performance in our C/I and CA feedback 
conditions (i.e., the overlap between feedback on the quiz and correct final test answers was far 
less than in most testing studies) and/or boosted performance in the minimal feedback condition 
(the ability to look previous quiz questions and the confidence in their answers appears to have 
been enough information to successfully guide restudy).  
To be more specific, we may have obtained an effect of feedback type if we had lessened 
the environmental support in the minimal feedback condition or boosted the overlap between the 
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quiz and final test questions (which should maximize the benefits of feedback). Examining the 
minimal feedback condition first, it is useful to imagine what the learning experience may have 
been like for these participants. First, they answer quiz questions and rate their confidence in 
each response. When they are provided minimal feedback, it is apparent to the learner whether or 
not they performed well overall (e.g., they were shown their overall score on the quiz; 34/40). 
Perhaps the learner then looked through the quiz to determine which items they were unsure 
about (and they can easily assess this because their confidence ratings are available). It is likely 
that many of their low-confidence answers were incorrect, and they can further begin to look at 
the multiple-choice response options to hypothesis test (i.e., seek out their own feedback by 
reading relevant sections in the textbook) which option may have been the correct one. 
Potentially, this was enough information to guide restudy and display equivalent final test 
performance to the other feedback conditions.  
Conversely, the C/I and CA feedback conditions may not have benefitted to the same 
degree as would be expected because we did not exclusively use repeated questions. A 
participant in either feedback condition, for example, might look at the questions they answered 
incorrectly and be able to glean from the feedback and response options alone what they believe 
the correct answer should have been (without returning to the text). This would have helped them 
answer an identical question on the final test, but their understanding of the underlying concepts 
may not have been complete. Therefore, when a final test question was different in both format 
and question stem (e.g., they were asked to provide a short-answer to an entirely different 
question targeting the same concept) the participant may not have been up to the task. We can 
partially address this claim by looking at differences in performance based on question stem. 
Although we found no interaction with condition, participants were better able to answer final 
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test questions containing the same stem as the previous quiz question than those containing 
different stems (see Figure 1). If the above claim is true, there should have been a significant 
interaction such that the C/I and CA conditions performed worse on different-stem questions 
than the minimal feedback condition. It could be that we simply did not have the power to detect 
such an effect, but in fact we obtained .94 power to detect a medium-sized within/between 
interaction. Therefore, perhaps the best interpretation is that we boosted performance in the 
minimal feedback condition, rather than hurt the C/I and CA conditions.  
Another possible reason why we did not find an effect of feedback type is that quiz 
performance was near-ceiling (84% correct), and prior research shows that feedback is especially 
helpful for items initially answered incorrectly (Bangert-Drowns et al., 1991; Butler & Roediger, 
2007; Pashler et al., 2005). Why we obtained higher performance than McDaniel et al. (2015), 
though we used the same subject pool and materials, can be explained by our retention interval. 
McDaniel and colleagues used a 5 day delay between their restudy session and the final test, 
whereas we only used a 2 day delay. Another possibility is that our selection methods allowed 
people with more prior knowledge to participate. Though we excluded participants who admitted 
taking a previous class on research methods, participants may have had higher levels of prior 
knowledge than desired. However, we did ask participants to gauge their prior knowledge of the 
material as part of a post-experimental questionnaire (on a scale of 1-10), and including this 
factor as a covariate in our ANOVA analyses did not affect the results (average prior knowledge 
M = 4.84).  
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1.4.2 Metacognitive Influences on the Interplay between Quizzing and 
Restudy 
Though we did not obtain a significant effect of feedback type, our design enabled us to 
examine the item-level influences of quizzing and restudy on final test performance. In model 2 
(see Table 2 and Figure 3) we showed that participants were more likely to answer a final test 
question correctly if they got it right on the quiz, that restudying the text led to greater final test 
performance, and that highlighting was only beneficial if they initially answered the quiz 
question incorrectly. Further, we found that these effects did not differ depending on the type of 
feedback participants received on the quiz. This is important for several reasons: First, people 
seemed able to identify which questions they answered correctly or incorrectly on the quiz, even 
in the minimal feedback condition. That is, participants displayed accurate metamemory even 
without much feedback, and were able to isolate questions they were uncertain about. Second, 
people were able to selectively target items for restudy that were objectively more difficult (i.e., 
concepts with lower average scores on the final test), as well as items that were individually 
more difficult (those they answered incorrectly on the quiz). Again, these effects did not differ 
by condition, suggesting that participants’ metacognitive monitoring in the minimal feedback 
condition was as good, or nearly as good, as those given item-level feedback. Finally, by 
selecting initially incorrect items to restudy, people improved their performance on the final test 
relative to those items they did not restudy.  
These results are in direct opposition to Rawson and Dunlosky (2007; Dunlosky et al., 
2005), who found that participants were over-confident in their self-scored responses even when 
CA feedback was provided, and that when no feedback was provided, participants were 
especially bad at self-scoring their responses (i.e., they displayed poor monitoring ability). 
Further, it is not immediately clear why this divergence occurred. Both their study and ours used 
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authentic materials (they used excerpts from textbook chapters), our study also contained 
definition questions as theirs did, and both studies had conditions which provided CA feedback. 
The only notable differences were that we provided minimal feedback, whereas they provided no 
feedback, and we quizzed participants using a multiple-choice format rather than cued-recall as 
they did. As mentioned previously, perhaps a combination of knowing generally how well one 
performed (e.g., 34/40 correct) when combined with an ability to simultaneously compare 
multiple-choice options was enough information to accurately judge the correctness of each 
response. Further, our participants were able to see the confidence ratings they gave for each 
question, and may have been able to effectively eliminate high-confidence responses from their 
considerations.  
Targeting the metacognitive influences within a quizzing and restudy scenario more 
specifically, we were able to test a variety of effects on restudy behavior and final test 
performance by obtaining confidence ratings after each quiz response. Before continuing, 
however, we should highlight our departure from using a common measure of metacognitive 
resolution (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2008). Resolution is the within-person correlation between 
confidence and accuracy (or restudy), and is typically calculated using the Goodman-Kruskal 
gamma coefficient for each participant. Gamma assesses the correlation between an ordinal 
factor and a nominal outcome. For example, a positive gamma coefficient (range, -1:1) between 
confidence ratings (1-10) and quiz accuracy (0, 1) would indicate that a participant was more 
likely to be correct (1) at higher levels of the confidence scale (e.g., 8, 9, 10), more likely to be 
incorrect (0) at lower levels of the confidence scale (1, 2, 3), and more likely to display 
variability on quiz performance in the middle of the scale (4, 5, 6, 7). Thus, a positive gamma 
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would indicate that a participant was accurately able to predict their performance. However, the 
gamma correlation runs into problems when participants do not use the full range of the scale.  
Take, as an extreme example, a participant who gave half of their quiz answers a 
confidence rating of 9, and the other half a confidence rating of 10. Because of the reduction in 
scale, a gamma correlation would only be perfect (1) in this scenario if every answer given a 9 
was incorrect, and every answer given a 10 was correct. Therefore, if our theoretical participant 
was perfectly accurate with confidence ratings of only 9s and 10s, they would have a gamma of 
0, which would indicate no resolution at all (though most people would agree that this participant 
had excellent resolution). Our data displayed extreme negative skew in confidence ratings (see 
Figure 9), presumably due to the high quiz performance. In fact, many participants had such 
good quiz performance and resolution that they did not use the full range of the scale. Several 
real participants, for example, only made confidence ratings between 6-10, and scored very 
highly on the quiz. Thus, their gamma correlations were actually negative. Our alternative 
approach, using multi-level logistic regression, accounts for the within-subject variance in 
confidence ratings (e.g., individuals may attribute different memory signals the same confidence 
rating) and does not encounter the same problems as gamma does with varying ordinal scales. 
Therefore, studies that have similar negative skew in confidence ratings, and participants who do 
not use the full range of the scale, may want to be wary when applying the gamma coefficient to 
determine metacognitive resolution.  
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Figure 9. Histogram displaying the frequency with which each confidence rating was given (0-
10) on the initial quiz.  
The statistical approach favored in this study therefore gives an overall measure of 
metacognitive accuracy in terms of odds ratios, but simultaneously accounts for within-person 
resolution by letting intercepts vary between participants. Using this method, we found support 
for the discrepancy reduction hypothesis (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998; Kulhavy & Stock, 1989) 
in that participants were more likely to restudy items they answered incorrectly on the quiz. 
Additionally, we found that items with the highest discrepancy (high-confidence incorrect) were 
more likely to be restudied than those with the lowest discrepancy (high-confidence correct). 
This indicates that people selectively focused their restudy behavior on items they thought they 
knew, but objectively did not. Further, as we showed in model 2, this restudy behavior was 
beneficial for final test performance. Finally, it is important to note that discrepancy reduction 
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effects were not dependent on the presence of feedback, and were obtained in our minimal 
feedback condition as well.  
Our results additionally broaden the influence of the discrepancy reduction framework by 
extending these findings to the use of naturalistic materials in authentic settings. The extensive 
review of study-time allocation by Son and Metcalfe (2000) shows that the vast majority of 
studies have been conducted using relatively impoverished materials, of which paired associates 
appear to be the most common. Our findings provide an important extension of the discrepancy 
reduction framework to additionally include complex conceptual information. Further, we found 
that following a discrepancy reduction approach boosted performance on the final test, even 
when that final test contained both definition and application short-answer questions. 
We did not find support for the region of proximal learning hypothesis (Son & Metcalfe, 
2000; Metcalfe, 2009), however, despite the fact that restudy time was experimenter-imposed 
(15 min) and presentation of the material was simultaneous (because it was a scrollable PDF of 
the book excerpts). Metcalfe (2009) has argued that in situations in which students are under 
time pressure (e.g., the night before an exam) and when you have the opportunity to 
simultaneously compare which items you could choose to restudy, students are especially likely 
to study in their region of proximal learning. Although our study contained these features, 
participants did not study in their own proximal region, but instead focused most of their 
restudying on difficult items. Much of the research showing proximal learning effects uses less 
naturalistic materials (e.g., cued-recall of foreign language vocabulary pairs), and this could be a 
possible reason for the departure of our results from prior studies. Additionally, it could be the 
case that participants judged 15 min to be plenty of time to study the more difficult concepts (i.e., 
they did not feel as though they were pressured for time).  
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Moving on to effects of quiz accuracy and confidence on final test performance, we 
examined whether participants hypercorrected their high-confidence errors and whether their 
low-confidence successes persevered to the final test (Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001; Butler et al., 
2008). Both of these metacognitive effects have been shown to contribute to the benefits of 
feedback on final test performance. We found significant hypercorrection effects in that 
participants were more likely to answer final test questions correctly for high-confidence errors 
than for low-confidence errors. We did not, however, replicate the Butler et al. (2008) findings: 
Low-confidence successes did not translate into higher performance than low-confidence errors. 
Just as in the case of our inability to find an effect of feedback type, it is possible that our use of 
authentic materials, combined with the generally high quiz performance, resulted in our inability 
to replicate the Butler et al. findings. However, in authentic settings, it may be that feedback 
simply benefits high-confidence errors more so than low-confidence successes (but also note that 
feedback was not necessary for hypercorrection effects, as they were still obtained in our 
minimal feedback condition). 
Although we cannot tease apart the differential effects of quiz performance and restudy 
behavior on JOLs because they were obtained following restudy, we were able to examine 
whether participants in a naturalistic study/test/restudy scenario made accurate predictions of 
final test performance. As seen in Figure 8, participants seemed to make fairly accurate 
predictions of final test performance based on their average JOL, though they were somewhat 
under-confident. These results suggest that some combination of quizzing, feedback, and restudy 
led students to be well-calibrated in their predictions. Many studies have found that immediate 
JOLs are far less accurate than delayed JOLs (a finding termed the delayed-JOL effect, Nelson & 
Dunlosky, 1991; Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992; 1994), which could also explain the high correlation 
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we obtained. For example, an additional possible explanation of our findings is that participants 
were basing predictions of their performance on only long-term memory, rather than now-
unaccessible short-term memory (after a delay), reducing the likelihood of being over-confident. 
However, when we look at participants’ calibration between immediate confidence ratings and 
their accuracy on the quiz (see Figure 10), participants still appeared to be under-confident, 
rather than over-confident. 
 
Figure 10. Calibration between participants’ average confidence ratings and quiz performance. 
Confidence ratings were divided by 10 to maintain the same scale (e.g., a confidence rating of 5 
became .50). The diagonal represents perfect calibration; therefore, data points above the 
diagonal represent under-confidence, and data points below the diagonal represent over-
confidence. Therefore, participants appear to be under-confident. 
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In sum, our findings help further the understanding of students’ metacognitive processes 
(especially in terms of study allocation policies) in a naturalistic educational setting. Although 
we believe the current methodology to be typical in terms of what is expected of most students, it 
should also be noted that there are significant departures from a completely authentic setting. To 
name a few, our participants do not have to juggle time pressures from other classes, we force 
participants to restudy even in situations that they may choose not to (e.g., with high quiz 
performance), and even when students do choose to restudy, their instructor may not provide 
them with a copy of their quiz. We believe that in most classrooms, however, students are asked 
to read a textbook or primary sources on unlearned information, come to class to hear a lecture 
on the topic, are perhaps quizzed as part of that class, and must go home to restudy before a final, 
summative test. Even if quizzes are not part of the classroom experience, most teachers do ask 
students to recall information from the beginning of the semester on cumulative final exams. 
Therefore, it is of critical importance to understand the metacognitive monitoring processes 
students use to base their restudy decisions on.  
Our study highlights several important factors within this scenario; most notably that type 
of feedback does not appear to have much influence on students’ restudy decisions or final test 
performance. However, we do find that students systematically choose to restudy questions they 
answered incorrectly, especially when they were highly confident in their responses. Further, this 
behavior appears to be adaptive, in that those items they chose to restudy were more likely to be 
answered correctly on the final test. Therefore, we end on the striking note that students seem to 
“know what they are doing”; and that as long as we structure our classes in such a way that there 
are plenty of opportunities for quizzing and restudy, they appear able to engage appropriate 
control processes and perform well in the class. 
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1.6  Appendices 
 
1.6.1 Instructions 
 
 Participants were initially told they would be reading a chapter on research methods in 
psychology, would take a quiz on this information, and have an opportunity to restudy before 
returning 2 days later to take the final test. They were instructed to read through the chapter at 
first, rather than study as they went, because it was long, and we wanted them to get through the 
whole thing. They were also told that it was alright if they did not finish, and that if they did they 
could study sections as they wished.  
 For the quiz, participants were told there were 40 multiple-choice options, and that they 
would have as much time as they needed, though it takes most people 15-20 min. Additionally, 
they were asked to indicate their confidence after each answer, on a scale of 1-10. We also 
encouraged them to use the full range of the scale, rather than simply putting 1s and 10s. After 
completion, they were told they would be playing Tetris for 5 min. 
 During restudy, participants were told they would have 15 min, and were asked to make a 
mark next to each paragraph they restudied. Rather than highlighting each line of the document, 
they were shown how to just make a small mark with the highlight tool next to whole 
paragraphs. They were also told that they could use their quiz during restudy. That is, they were 
told if they wanted to they could look at the quiz to help guide restudy.  
 For the final test, participants were simply told to answer to the best of their ability, but 
that they did not need to write an essay for each short answer question. They had unlimited time, 
but were informed that most people took approximately 30-45 min.  
